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1. Background 
Concerns over global warming have led to proposals for the establishment of market for 
greenhouse gas emission reductions. The major impact was the establishment of Kyoto 
Protocol in the mid-1990s. According to the Protocol most developed countries agreed to 
legally binding targets that will reduce emissions of the six main greenhouse gases by at 
least 5% below 1990 levels over the period 2008-2012. Since then the question of emission 
trading became one of the most important agendas not only on political level but also on the 
corporate.  
One of the challenges that our world is facing today is how to account for these emissions. 
The International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee issued IFRIC 3, Emission 
Rights (2004). However, significant pressure from various parties, who objected the 
financial consequences of applying that interpretation, led to the cancellation of mentioned 
document. 
At the moment there exists no uniform guidance on the question of how to treat emissions 
rights, but the IFRS developers have developed several approaches to account for the effects 
of emissions trading schemes. 
 
2. Initial review of the literature and key references 
Since the introduction of the idea of emissions trading there were created a number of 
options on how to account for the emissions rights. The international accounting bodies 
(IASB and FASB) have this question on their agendas for several years and are conducting a 
joint project to resolve the issue (official page of IASB, 2010). 
The big auditing firms are also concerned with the question. The year of 2007 was filled 
with reports from the auditing leaders (Deloitte & Touche LLP, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
LLP) as they discussed the approaches used in the market place. 
Academics also think that companies need to develop organizational routines to deal with 
emission allowances and represent this new “object” in the company’s accounting system 
(MacKenzie, 2007). And there is already prove that companies in various countries find 
different typical solutions to the problem of accounting for carbon emissions (Bailey, 2007; 
Engels, Huth & Knoll, 2008). 
 
 
3. Research Questions and Methods for the analysis 
First we will describe the background of emissions trading, the existing markets for the 
emissions rights and the way the question of greenhouse gas emission reductions affects 
different industries. 
The main questions of the research will be what is an essence of emissions rights, are these 
rights assets, how should they be accounted for in the financial statements, how different 
approaches to accounting of emissions rights might influence the financial outcomes of the 
entities. We will also analyze the policies that companies follow in the current situation and 
whether or not they correspond to the regulatory approaches. 
To achieve set goals a number of published works relating to the issues of emissions trading, 
accounting treatments of various financial variables (i.e. intangible assets, expenses) will be 
examined and their knowledge synthesized for the future use. Findings of the research will 
provide a ground for the analysis of the nature of the emissions rights and their 
representation by the companies in the financial statements.  
 
 
4. Contribution and expected outcomes 
The research is touching upon one of the most important current issues – the issue of 
accounting for the rights to emit pollutants. In the thesis we will attempt to define the 
essence of the rights and how they should be treated according to the accounting procedures 
since no uniform decision exists. We expect the results to be of use by the academics and 
the practitioners while developing the final outlook on the issue. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper briefly describes the origin of the analyzed problem – what led to the 
establishment of market for greenhouse gas emission reductions. The author focuses on one 
of the main challenges that were created along with the idea of emissions trading.  
In this thesis the issue of accounting for emissions rights, which is considered one of the 
most important in the current business world, is analyzed. The efforts of the international 
accounting advisors to solve the issue are discussed along with the reaction of the active 
companies to such actions. Also the writer talks about the problems with financial 
statements that arise due to the lack of uniform guidance and how businesses deal with 
them. 
The author critically evaluates the existing literature on the questions of emissions 
trading schemes, allocation possibilities of emissions allowances and the views of various 
academics on the main topic. 
The empirical part of the paper presents interest due to its practical value based on the 
current information. The researcher analyzes the disclosure of accounting policy concerned 
with emissions allowances in 80 companies starting from the beginning of the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 2005, till the latest data available. The results present 
that even though the majority (60%) does indeed reveal information on the topic, the 40% 
still believe that there is no such need.  
According to the findings, 45% of the companies consider emissions allowances to be 
intangible assets, while only 9% of the sample sees allowances as inventory. 38% of the 
companies do not specify their view on the nature of the allowances. Finally, 4% consider 
them assets without specifics and the last 4% state that they do not recognize the allowances 
since there is no guidance from the standard setters. 
Moreover, this paper tests the idea that company’s financial situation can influence its 
decision to disclose information on accounting treatment of emissions allowances. The 
results show that financial stability in terms of profitability is the only financial influence on 
the company’s choice. 
Finally, the author concludes that the discussed problems can and will be solved within 
the passage of time and additional research from all the interested parties. As a 
recommendation the paper suggests continuous and active cooperation among businesses, 
standard setters and other affected social and economic groups. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We are considered “the most fortunate generations that have ever lived . . . [and] might 
also be the most fortunate generations that ever will’ (Monbiot, 2006, p. xi).  
We are living in social and economic reality that was created by the industrial 
revolution. It impacted not only our lifestyle but also the planet, which is our natural habitat. 
The main aspect of this revolution was the usage of fossil fuels in creating the energy to 
drive industrialization. Fossil fuels (i.e. coal, gas, oil) are storages of carbon that have been 
created in the distant geological past. Before utilizing fossil fuels, society relied upon carbon 
that could be accessed from the biosphere (for example, in the form of wood) as well as 
energy that could be derived from the environment such as water, wind and from the sun. 
The outcome of industrialization has had both positive and negative results. The biggest 
negative effect is concern about the ecological costs of industrialization. The key aspect of 
the ecological impact is that rising greenhouse gases (hereafter GHGs) concentrations will 
trigger global climate change (hereafter GCC) which will itself have net adverse ecological, 
social and economic effects. (Bebbington et al., 2008, p.699) 
 
1.1. Greenhouse effect 
 
The ‘greenhouse effect’ (discovered and described by Fourier in 1829) is an essential 
natural process for the maintenance of life on our planet. Earth receives energy from the sun, 
a part of which (approximately 70%) penetrates the atmosphere with the rest being reflected 
back into space (Le Treut et al., 2007, p. 96). Of the energy that makes it into the 
atmosphere, a portion is absorbed by the earth’s surface with the rest being reflected back 
into the atmosphere (called infrared radiation). As the atmosphere is more permeable to 
incoming solar radiation compared to outgoing infrared radiation, a proportion of the 
infrared radiation remains within the atmosphere and this creates the greenhouse effect. The 
result of this effect is that the average surface temperature of the planet is some 33 degrees 
Celsius higher than it would otherwise be (see Le Treut et al., 2007, p. 97).  
A number of atmospheric gases are involved in creating the greenhouse effect with 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexaflouride as well as hydrofluorocarbons 
and perfluorocarbons playing a significant role. The warming effect of any one gas is 
determined by a combination of the amount of that gas released, its warming potential 
 
 
(determined by how sensitive it is to infrared radiation) and the length of time a gas exists in 
the atmosphere before it breaks down (light causes these gases to break down into their 
component parts). Table A1 (Relative contributions of gases to global warming) in the 
Appendix provides a summary of the main GHGs, their life in the atmosphere and their 
warming potential.  
Over the last 600,000 years the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide equivalents 
has fluctuated between 180 and 300 ppm1. Ice ages have been experienced at the bottom of 
the range and interglacial conditions at the higher end (we are currently in an interglacial 
period2). Scientists have also been able to measure atmospheric temperature over this time 
and have identified a correlation between GHGs and temperature, with anthropogenic 
emissions being responsible for changes being observed in the climate (IPCC, 2001; Stern, 
2006)3
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere are nowadays higher than they have been at any 
time in the past six hundred years. They have increased from a pre-industrial level of 280 
ppm in 1750 to current levels of 430 ppm (rising at a minimum of 2 ppm each year – Stern, 
2006, p. xvi). These surges have the effect of increasing average global temperatures
. 
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 and it 
is these increases that create impacts of concern (Table A2 in the Appendix describes few of 
the impacts that may come up if GCC accelerates). The potential (and actual) impacts of 
GCC have led to significant global concern and substantive policy action.  
1.2. Kyoto Protocol 
 
In December 1997, after long preliminary actions and debates, the Kyoto Protocol (or 
simply the Protocol) was negotiated. It came into force on February 16th, 2005. 
The Kyoto Protocol (European Commission, 2005) is a legally binding agreement under 
which 37 industrialized countries (called Annex I countries”) obliged themselves to reduce 
                                                            
1 These concentrations refer to the warming effect of GHGS in equivalent concentrations of carbon dioxide in 
parts per million of atmospheric volume 
2 This period refers to the current "Holocene" interglacial which began about 10,000 years ago. – National 
Climatic Data Center (http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/globalwarming/interglacial.html - last accessed on 18th 
of August 2010) 
3 There are a number of natural factors that affect the climate system. For example, solar intensity (or ‘sun 
spots’) and volcanic eruptions. In addition, other human activities such as particulate emissions sometimes also 
called global dimming) affect the greenhouse effect. Climate science adjusts estimates of global temperature 
for natural events and has established that the current warming effect can be directly traced to human activities 
(see Stern, 2006, Chapter 1). 
4 Temperature increases are not evenly spread. Warming at the poles will be greater than the rate of warming 
at the equator. 
 
 
collective emissions of GHGs by 5.2% compared to the year of 1990. The goal is to lower 
overall emissions from six abovementioned GHGs calculated as an average over the five-
year period of 2008-125
Article 25 of the Protocol specifies that the document enters into force "on the 90-th day 
after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties 
included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide 
emissions for 1990 of the Annex I countries, have deposited their instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession." 
. National targets range from 8% reductions for the European Union 
(the EU) and some others to 7% for the United States of America (the USA), 6% for Japan, 
0% for Russia, and permitted increases of 8% for Australia and 10% for Iceland." 
The European Union and its Member States ratified the Protocol in May 2002. Of the 
two conditions, the "55 parties" clause was reached on 23 May 2002 when Iceland ratified 
the Protocol. The ratification by Russia on 18 November 2004 satisfied the "55%" clause 
and brought the treaty into force, effective 16 February 2005, after the required lapse of 90 
days. 
As of September 2010, 187 countries and one regional economic organization 
(the European Community) have ratified the agreement, representing over 63.9% of the 
1990 emissions from Annex I countries. The most notable non-party to the Protocol is 
the United States, which is a party to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and was responsible for 36.1% of the 1990 emission levels of Annex I 
countries. The Protocol can be signed and ratified only by parties to UNFCCC, (Article 24) 
and a country can withdraw by giving 12 months notice. (Article 27) 
In figure 1.2.16
 
  we depicted the current state of global feeling towards the Protocol, 
where dark green indicates countries that have signed and ratified the treaty, grey is not yet 
decided, and red is no intention of ratifying. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 United Nations Environment Program press release on Kyoto Protocol agreement 
6 http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratification.pdf 
 
 
Figure 1.2.1. Kyoto Protocol Participation Map 
 
The Protocol allows for several "flexible mechanisms", such as emissions trading, the 
clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI) to allow Annex I 
countries to meet their GHG emission limitations by purchasing GHG emission reductions 
credits from elsewhere, through financial exchanges, projects that reduce emissions in non-
Annex I countries, from other Annex I countries, or from annex I countries with excess 
allowances. 
 
1.3. Emissions trading 
 
Since the introduction of the Protocol, the question of emissions trading (hereafter ET) 
became one of the most important agendas not only on political level but also on the 
corporate. Concerns over global warming have led to proposals for the establishment of 
market for GHGs emission reductions.  
On a global level, ET between governments has been established as one of three flexible 
mechanisms in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. On the national level, many 
industrialized countries-ratifiers as well as non-ratifiers of the Protocol – have either 
introduced or are considering company-based emissions trading systems (see Schule and 
Sterk, 2008; Sterk et al., 2006).  
For International Emissions Trading (IET), the economic basis for providing this 
flexibility is that the marginal cost of emission abatement differs among countries. Trade 
could potentially allow the Annex I countries to meet their emission reduction commitments 
at a reduced cost. This is due to trade allowing emissions to be abated first in countries 
where the costs of abatement are lowest, thus increasing the efficiency of the Kyoto 
agreement.  
 
 
The most advanced emissions trading system (ETS) is the one developed by the EU in 
2005. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) (referenced in Grubb et al., 2009, p. 11) suggested that 
during its first two years in operation, the EU ETS turned an expected increase in emissions 
of 1-2 percent per year into a small absolute decline. Grubb et al. (2009, p. 11) suggested 
that a reasonable estimate for the emissions cut achieved during its first two years of 
operation was 50-100 MtCO2 per year, or 2.5-5 percent. 
It should be noted that at the early stages of discussions on ET as an integral part of the 
Kyoto Protocol the EU countries were against the idea. They feared that Europeans would 
regard emission certificates as a ‘right to pollute’ or as ‘trading in indulgences’, that trading 
in this new and complex instrument would prove impossible within the specified time 
period, and that the United States had introduced the proposal in order to delay the 
negotiations (see Grubb et al., 1999, p. 92 – referenced in Braun, 2009). However, the 
official withdrawal of the USA from the Protocol in 2001 was one of the main factors for 
the alteration of the EU’s position on the question. Another major reason of EU’s 
acceptance and introduction of emissions trading was its inability to introduce the EU-wide 
CO2-tax7
 
. 
1.4. Carbon market 
 
 “The combination of global warming and growing environmental consciousness is 
creating a potentially huge market in the trading of pollution-emission credits." – Economist 
Craig Mellow, May 2008. 
Carbon markets exist in two main types: ‘allowance-based’ and ‘project-based’. 
Allowance-based type is a type in which the buyer purchases emissions allowances 
(hereafter will be considered synonyms with emissions rights) created and allocated (or 
auctioned) by regulators under cap-and-trade regimes, such as Assigned Amount Units 
(AAUs) under the Kyoto Protocol, or European Union Allowances (EUAs) under the EU 
ETS. “Cap-and-trade” allowance markets have high environmental credibility because they 
create a flexible structure to help achieve the desired level of environmental performance 
established by the level of caps.  
Project-based transactions, in which the buyer purchases emission credits from a 
project, which can credibly and verifiably demonstrate that it reduces GHG emissions 
                                                            
7 For more detailed studies on carbon tax see for example Ellerman and Buchner, 2007 
 
 
compared with what would have happened otherwise. The most notable examples of such 
activities are under the CDM and the JI framework under the Kyoto Protocol, generating 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) respectively. 
These project-based mechanisms have strong environmental credibility because they are 
created using approved methodologies and benefit from being independently certified before 
they are issued. 
The World Bank (WB) reports that the worldwide carbon market has grown 
exponentially since its conception. The EU ETS, which is the largest GHG market 
nowadays, along with CDM and JI markets form the core of the world’s carbon market. In 
the table 1.4.1 we can see WB’s annual estimates8
 
 of the size of the carbon market. 
Table 1.4.1 Annual estimates of the size of the global carbon market 
 Volume (millions metric tones, MtCO2) Dollars (millions, US) 
Year MAM9 PBT 10 Total  MAM PBT Total 
2005 328 382 710 7,971 2,894 10,864 
2006 1,134 611 1,745 24,699 6,536 31,235 
2007 2,109 874 2,984 49,361 13,646 63,007 
2008 3,278 1,558 4,836 101,492 33,574 135,066 
2009 7,362 1,338 8,700 122,822 20,913 143,735 
 
1.5. Emissions trading schemes 
 
As was already noted there are two main types of ET schemes:    
• Cap-and-trade schemes 
• Baseline-and-credit schemes. 
Emissions cap-and-trade schemes and baseline-and-credit schemes represent two 
different mechanisms for establishing a cap on emissions. The introduction of a trading 
mechanism that is needed for regulation of the emissions is intended to achieve the cap on 
emissions more efficiently than other mechanisms that regulate access to restricted 
resources (i.e. a tax on emissions). The reason for this is that the trading mechanism results 
in a market-based signal that determines the price of emitting. Under the market-based 
                                                            
8 World Bank publications on the State and Trends of the carbon market 2006-2010 
9 Main Allowances Markets 
10 Project Based Transactions 
 
 
mechanism, if the costs of avoiding emissions are less than what the participants receive if 
they sell allowances or credits, participants will avoid emissions and then sell allowances (in 
a cap-and-trade scheme) or credits (in a baseline-and-credit scheme). On the other hand, if 
the costs of avoiding emissions exceed what participants have to pay to buy the equivalent 
amount of allowances or credits, participants will emit and will buy allowances or credits to 
pay for those emissions. (Starbatty, 2010) 
The main difference between cap-and-trade schemes and baseline-and-credit schemes is 
– the schemes implement the cap on emissions differently. Cap-and-trade schemes 
implement the cap on emissions by issuing allowances to emit up to the cap; while baseline-
and-credit schemes implement the cap on emissions by assigning individual baselines to 
participants up to the cap. In terms of regulating emissions, baseline-and-credit schemes 
may be seen as equivalent to cap-and-trade schemes if the cap implicit in the baseline-and-
credit scheme is fixed and is numerically equal to the fixed cap in a cap cap-and-trade 
scheme. Main features of both types are summarized in table 1.5.111
 
. 
Table 1.5.1. Main features of emissions trading schemes 
Type of the scheme Cap-and-trade Baseline-and-credit 
Cap on emissions units of emissions that may be released within 
commitment period 
Implementation of cap allowances up to cap 
(a) free allocation to 
participants and/or 
(b) sale of allowances 
baselines up to cap 
free allocation to 
participants 
Trading mechanism allowances are tradable baseline is not tradable 
credits are tradable 
Offsetting emissions allowances covering total 
emissions 
credits covering only 
emissions in excess of 
baseline 
 
The current situation on the implementation of ET schemes throughout the world is 
monitored by a number of agencies such as World Bank, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 
Ecosystem Marketplace, Point Carbon, Carbon Trust etc.  
Among the cap-and-trade schemes there are, according to WB (2010), five regional 
markets. EU ETS is the biggest one (85% of the total allowance markets’ volume in 2009 
and 96% of the value amount), followed by Regional GHG Initiative (RGGI) (11% and 
                                                            
11 Starbatty, 2010, p.20 
 
 
1.8% respectively) and market of AAU (2% and 1.6% respectively). The other two schemes 
were less prominent in 2009 with Chicago Climate Exchange (CCE) and New South Wales 
GHG Reduction Scheme (NSW GGRS) ending the year with insignificant amounts both in 
volume and value. Thought it should be noted that CCE lost its runner-up position to both 
RGGI and AAU as compared to 2008. (World Bank, 2010, p.1) 
The second type of markets is less material as compared to the cap-and-trade markets. 
Primary CDM, JI and voluntary markets gained as much as 3% of the world carbon market 
volume in 2009. However, the market for so-called “spot and secondary Kyoto offsets” was 
much more prominent taking 12% of the global carbon traded volume in 2009. 
 
1.6. Global challenge 
 
One of the challenges in terms of combating global warming that our world is facing 
today is how to account for the emissions that give basis for the allowances and credits 
traded all over the globe. A new commodity12
The Emissions Rights (as named by the International Financial Reporting Interpretations 
Committee (hereafter IFRIC)) affair is worth studying because it illustrates the problems 
faced by standard setters as they explore the frontiers of accounting. Just as the science of 
medicine sometimes advances by examination of its failures to deal with newly presenting 
diseases, so, in other fields, an understanding of the roots of failures can lead to a fuller 
understanding of the discipline involved, its limitations and its possibilities. Three features 
in particular lay at the heart of the challenge posed to standard setters as they sought to deal 
with emissions rights: 
 – an emission allowance or emission credit – 
needs to be brought into being: defined legally and technically, allocated to market 
participants, made transferable and tradable, and so on. 
a) A previously costless activity had become costly. 
b) Governments mitigated the cost. 
c) By means of marketable allowances. 
It is the combination of these features that has so far proved an insuperable problem for 
accounting to reflect. 
                                                            
12 Detailed discussion on whether or not emissions allowance is a commodity can be found in Button, 2008 
 
 
The international accounting bodies (IASB and FASB)13
Based on the absence of authoritative treatment by the regulating bodies, several 
approaches have developed that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
preparers apply to account for the effects of emissions trading schemes. A survey by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) and the International Emissions Trading Association 
(IETA) identified as many as fifteen variations to account for the effects of EU ETS
 have combined their powers in 
order to solve this problem. Such cooperation was brought on by the lack of uniform 
guidance on how to treat emission rights even though the standard setters proposed several 
approaches. However, the attempts at guidance, issued by IFRIC and/or by Emerging Issues 
Task Force (EITF) over the years, were not taken well by the practicing businesses. 
“Corporations generally fear earnings volatility: there is a widespread conviction that 
investors prefer earnings that rise smoothly to those that fluctuate, even around the same 
underlying trend.” (MacKenzie, 2008, p.18) 
14
 
. The 
Table A3 in the Appendices highlights the three main approaches. There is evidence that the 
largest European players mostly rely on Approach 3. 
Taking into account all the above-mentioned information we are going to research the 
issue of accounting for the rights to emit pollutants. In the thesis we will attempt to define 
the essence of the rights and how they should be treated according to the accounting 
procedures since no uniform decision exists. We expect the results to be of use by the 
academics and the practitioners while developing the final outlook on the issue. 
The main questions of the research will be what is an essence of emissions rights, are 
these rights assets, how should they be accounted for in the financial statements, how 
different approaches to accounting of emissions rights might influence the financial position 
of the entities. We will also analyze the policies that companies follow in the current 
situation and whether or not they correspond to the regulatory approaches. 
 
                                                            
13 IASB – International Accounting Standards Board; FASB - Financial Accounting Standards Board 
14 See ‘Trouble-entry accounting - Revisited: Uncertainty in accounting for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
and Certified Emission Reductions.’ (http://www.pwc.co.uk/pdf/trouble_entry_accounting.pdf accessed: 
01.07.2010 
 
 
2. Accounting for emissions: attempts at regulation and existing 
practices 
 
“There is a widespread feeling that the EU ETS has made great progress but that the 
pace of change has not always been matched by its infrastructure. Carbon financial 
accounting is a case in point. The industry is plagued with diversity of accounting and no 
uniform approach seems to be in sight… The impact of accounting is increasingly 
important. Companies trading within the EU ETS perceive increasingly how allowances and 
carbon credits represent a significant asset. For example, between 2008 and 2012 some 2 
billion allowances15
Andrei Marcu, Former President and CEO, IETA 
 will be issued. The important question is how these are recorded for 
accounting purposes.” 
 
2.1. Allocation 
 
In terms of EU ETS there are basically two ways to allocate emissions allowances: 
auctioning and free of charge. In the context of ET, the latter is often referred to as 
“grandfathering”16
Under Phases 1 (period of 2005 – 2007) and 2 (period of 2008 – 2012), allowances 
generally were and are allocated free to participating entities under the ETS. During Phase 
1, EU-ETS Directive allowed countries to auction up to 5% of allowance, rising to 10% 
under Phase 2.
. It is possible to combine these two methods of allocation, and there are a 
number of ways of doing both.  
17
                                                            
15 Figures from Societe Generale 
 Under Phase 1, only 4 of 25 countries used auctions at all, and only 
Denmark auctioned the full 5%. The political difficulty in introducing substantial auctioning 
into ETS allowance allocations is the almost universal agreement by covered entities in 
favor of free allocation and opposition to auctions. (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007) Free 
allocation constitutes a sole transfer of wealth to the entities receiving them from the 
government issuing them. The resulting movement of wealth has been described by several 
analysts as “windfall profits.” (see Deutsche Bank Research (2007) and  Betz and Sato 
16 In a strict sense, a “grandfathered” right is not related to the notion of the allocation free of charge of a 
realizable asset, but rather to a historical right to do something, such as vote, that can be transmitted to 
descendants or retained by a legal entity during its continued existence, but which is not transferable beyond 
those pre-determined limits 
17 For a further discussion of auctioning and the ETS, see Cameron Hepburn et. al., “Auctioning of EU ETS 
phase II allowances: how and why?” 6 Climate Policy (2006), pp. 137-160. 
 
 
(2006)) As concluded by Ellerman and Buchner (2007): “Allocation in the EU ETS 
provides one more example that, notwithstanding the advice of economists, the free 
allocation of allowances is not to be easily set aside.” 
 
2.2. IFRIC versus emissions rights 
 
This division of the ways of allocation brought about one of the major accounting issues 
- accounting treatment for allowances issued for less than fair value by government. This 
issue was in line with defining the nature of both allowances and obligations for emitted 
gases in the accounting field. Due to a significant number of companies involved in the EU 
ETS, which started operations in 2005, IFRIC in 2002 decided that it should develop an 
interpretation to explain how entities should apply IFRSs to cap and trade schemes like the 
EU ETS (IASB, 2010). 
IFRIC developed proposals in accordance with IFRSs in 2002-2003, and issued draft 
interpretation “D1 Emission Rights” (D1) in May 2003. In the interpretation IFRIC focused 
on the following issues: 
• Does an emissions allowance scheme give rise to (1) a net asset or liability or (2) an 
asset (for allowances held) and a liability, deferred income and/or income? 
• If a separate asset is recognized, what is its nature? 
• If a separate liability, deferred income and/or income are recognized, what is the 
nature of the item and how is it measured? 
• When should a potential penalty, which will be incurred if a participating party fails 
to deliver enough (sufficient) allowances to cover its actual emissions, be 
recognized, and how should it be measured? 
Along the lines of set questions IFRIC proposed next solutions: 
a) Allowances held are Intangible assets (should be accounted according to IAS18
b) The difference between the fair value of allowances and the amount participants pay for 
them is recognized as Government Grant (see IAS20). In EU ETS member states 
allocate the majority of allowances free to participants. 
38) and 
should be recorded at fair value.  
c) A liability for the obligation to deliver allowances equal to produced emissions should 
be recognized in income if there are any gains and/or losses 
                                                            
18 IAS – International Accounting Standard 
 
 
d) According to D1 allowances (assets) are treated independently to the obligations 
(liabilities), thus negating the possibility of netting off (offsetting) of the asset and 
liability. 
 
Most people would agree that purchased allowances are an asset, in all likelihood 
because they have a cost. However, the IASB defines an asset as ‘a resource controlled by 
the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to 
flow to the entity’. IFRIC discovered that allowances allocated by government met this 
definition. They are controlled by the entity from the moment of the past event – allocation 
– by which they were acquired. They are expected to generate future benefits for the entity 
either when tendered in settlement of an emissions liability or through sale into the market.  
However, in determining whether allowances were a financial instrument or an 
intangible asset, IFRIC encountered a more artificial difficulty of the IASB’s creation. It 
would have been convenient if the allowances could have been classified as one of the 
classes of assets that IASs require to be re-measured to fair value at each reporting date, 
with gains and losses reported in profit or loss. The reason is that under IAS 3719
Instead, IFRIC decided that the allowances fell within the definition of an intangible 
asset. Although such assets may be re-measured to fair value if they can be traded in an 
active market, IASs currently require the resulting gains and losses to be reported outside 
profit or loss. Symmetry of treatment with that of the liability therefore eluded the IFRIC. 
 the 
liability for emissions must be measured and reported in that way. IASs require financial 
instruments held for trading to be on this basis but IFRIC decided that the allowances did 
not meet the definition of a financial instrument. Nor did they fall within the limited class of 
other assets that could be measured like financial instruments.  
Moreover, the IFRIC decided that the obligation to pay for emissions by delivering 
allowances to the government after the end of the period was a liability. It clearly fell within 
the IASB’s definition, ‘a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the 
settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources 
embodying economic benefits’. An obligation arose as emissions were made – the past 
event – which would require the entity to part in the future with resources – the allowances 
– embodying economic benefits – the ability to be used to settle further obligations or be 
sold in the market. 
                                                            
19 IAS 37 – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets 
 
 
Next on the agenda was to determine how the corresponding credit for free allocation of 
allowances (the grant) should be treated, if the allowances are recognized as an asset. IFRIC 
decided that any allocation below fair value fell within the definition of government grants, 
essentially a government’s ‘transfers of resources to an entity in return for past or future 
compliance with certain conditions relating to the operating activities of the entity’. It 
argued that the obligation under an Emission Rights scheme to reduce emissions or deliver 
allowances was a condition ‘relating to the operating activities of the entity’. At the outset, 
the grant and the allowances are measured at the fair value of the allowances at the time the 
grant is made. As noted above, under IASs the allowances may, but do not have to be re-
measured to fair value; the grant, however, is not re-measured.  
Under the existing version of IAS 2020
 
, income from the grant is recognized gradually in 
line with recognition of the activity to which the grant relates. For example, a grant towards 
the purchase of a machine is recognized in the income statement over the same period as 
depreciation of the machine. In a paragraph of the draft interpretation that attracted virtually 
no comment, IFRIC noted IASB’s long-standing intention to propose amendment of IAS 
20: IASB had already discussed publicly its proposal to require income from a government 
grant to be recognized over the period to the point at which the grant could no longer be 
recalled. The rationale for the change was that beyond that point no liability existed: the 
whole grant therefore needed by then to be recognized in income. The effect of such a 
change would be that a grant of emissions allowances would have to be recognized in 
income immediately on its receipt at the start of the annual cycle. 
2.3. Reaction to the work of IFRIC 
 
Many respondents to D1 (over 40 comment letters)21
The main problem highlighted in the commentaries was artificial volatility in the 
statement of income, which appears because of two factors: 
 welcomed that IFRIC had tackled 
this topic – they thought that guidance in this area was important, although some observed 
that because emission trading schemes were only starting the guidance was premature. 
Besides D1 had a lot of criticism as to the effect of the interpretation to the profit and loss if 
applied in real economy. 
                                                            
20 IAS 20 - Government Grants 
21 According to Memo by IETA on Accounting treatment of EU Allowances 
 
 
1) The allowances are not expected to be re-measured to reflect changes in their value; 
2) The release of the government grant to the income is done according to the initial 
value of the allowances. On the other hand, the liability that arises, as the entity emits, is 
measured to the fair value of the allowances. Even if the entity decides to measure the 
allowances at market value, there will definitely be an imbalance due to some gains and 
losses being reported in the income statement, while others appear in equity. 
Also many respondents felt that D1 failed to understand and reflect the economic nature 
of an ET scheme22
a) A net model, under which an entity does not recognize allocated allowances, and 
accounts for actual emissions only when it holds insufficient allowances to cover 
those emissions
. This failure led to the alternative accounting solutions or changes to D1 
being proposed by the commenting parties. Among them were: 
23
b) Treatment of allowances as an item of inventory; 
; 
c) Accounting for allowances as financial assets and measuring them at fair value with 
subsequent gains and losses recognized directly in income; 
d) Treatment of allowances as derivatives and accounting for them as a cash flow 
hedge; 
e) Creation of guidance on how to account for allowances and obligations if there is no 
active market 
f) Specification of requirements for disclosure on all related issues 
 
IFRIC noted the key concern regarding the lack of symmetry in the accounting for 
emissions allowances. It recommended that IASB amend the existing IAS3824
As a result of the suggested treatment of allowances and emissions the companies could 
meet with a number of problems. Among them are – in fair value accounting approach 
companies face the possibility of a highly volatile prices which need to be reflected in the 
income statement; taxation issues should be addressed thoroughly as different countries 
 to create a 
new category of intangible assets. The idea would be to require allowance (or any similar 
intangible assets) to be measured at market price with all the changes in value recognized in 
the income statement. Such approach is not allowed according to the current IAS38. 
                                                            
22 Memo by IETA as well as Trouble-Entry Accounting by PwC 
23 For more discussion on pros and cons of particular suggestion see Cook, 2009 
24 IAS 38 – Intangible Assets 
 
 
subject the companies to various taxes depending on the financial accounting treatment. 
And finally, companies have to decide on the way to impair their new assets.  
In September 2004, IFRIC decided to issue its Interpretation (IFRIC 3 Emission Rights) 
largely as exposed in D1. The result was a public outcry. Companies complained that 
application of the interpretation would force them into showing a completely distorted 
picture of their performance in their annual and interim financial statements.  
The IASB, while recognizing that IFRIC had made a valid interpretation of the relevant 
IASs, accepted that the end result was confusing in certain respects. In June 2005, the Board 
also considered a request from the European Commission (EC) to defer the effective date of 
IFRIC 3 (although it was already effective from 1 March 2005). The EC observed that 
markets for EUAs, which are necessary for the proper functioning of the EU ETS, although 
developing rapidly, were thin. As a result, the Board reasoned that there was not as urgent a 
need for an Interpretation.  
In line with the reduced urgency for an Interpretation and the requests from IFRIC to 
amend Standards, the Board decided to withdraw IFRIC 3 so that, free of IFRIC’s constraint 
of interpreting existing Standards, it could address the underlying accounting in a more 
comprehensive way then originally envisaged by IFRIC.  
 
2.4. Recent progress of IASB 
 
It has to be noted that in the recent years the activity on ETS project started growing. 
Both IASB and FASB directed their attention to the increasing international use of ETSs 
and the considerable diversity in practice that appears to have arisen in the absence of 
authoritative guidance. The staff from both boards published a number of papers on the 
subject. They addressed the main accounting issues related to the inception of two main 
types of ETS.  
Some of the recent papers focused on accounting for the items in a voluntary scheme 
(EU ETS is a statutory scheme) as a starting point for structuring the discussion of statutory 
schemes, taking into consideration the differences between them. They also produced a set 
of examples to facilitate and highlight some cross cutting issues with other projects of the 
board. The boards also addressed the questions of accounting for issued tradable offsets, 
government grants etc. (see Staff Papers on the Project Emissions Trading Schemes) 
 
 
The work continues and at the moment the boards are considering a research paper 
(Starbatty, 2010) that describes the mechanisms and types of emissions trading schemes, as 
well as an outline of other types of regulation that restrict access to resources. The paper 
also provides discusses ETSs as well as the scope of the IASB’s Emissions Trading 
Schemes project.  
Close to the end of 2010 staff plans to present a comprehensive package of the main 
accounting issues on the project to the boards. The exposure draft as a basis for future 
regulation is supposed to be issued by second half of 2011 (IASB official web-site). 
To conclude, the recent progress made by the accounting standard setters is not 
significant. According to IASB, both FASB and IASB “tentatively” decided that purchased 
and allocated allowances should be recognized as assets. What is more, they “decided that a 
liability exists when the allowances are allocated because the definition of a liability is met. 
The obligating event in this case is the allocation of allowances.”  However a very long road 
lies ahead of the official accounting bodies as they plan to discuss a vast number of 
questions starting with the issues of measurement and presentation (including netting) and 
whether a right to future allocations can be recognized as an asset. 
 
2.5. Company approaches to accounting for emissions allowances 
 
Due to current lack of accounting guidance on the issue companies need to develop 
organizational routines to deal with emission allowances and represent this new ‘‘object’’ in 
the company’s accounting system (MacKenzie, 2007). It can therefore be expected – and 
has already been shown (Bailey, 2007; Engels et al., 2008) – that companies in various 
European member states find different typical solutions to the problem of accounting for 
their carbon emissions and finding an orientation in the new trading scheme.  
Engels (2009) found out through a survey of European companies (all companies 
covered by the trading scheme in Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the 
Netherlands) that they use various sources of information and expertise to make sense of 
carbon markets. According to the study the sources of expertise can form specific cognitive 
bases in which companies develop a new mindset to account for carbon. 
However, apart from information on which perspectives are developed, the survey also 
reveals a level of ignorance among some of the companies, showing that they have not used 
Phase 1 to develop such a perspective. One indicator for this is the large share of companies 
 
 
that up to this date do not know their own abatement costs. This remains a puzzle; even with 
the explanation that an allowance price of near zero does not incur costly search strategies 
within the companies. It should have been obvious that emitting carbon will be restricted 
and will most probably continue to become more expensive in the long run. 
Meanwhile PwC, one of the key players involved in ET, produced a report, where they 
focused both on accounting for emissions allowances in terms of EU ETS and the 
accounting for CERs. The main idea behind the report was to gather practical experience of 
various businesses in how they account for raised issues as well as to disclose problems that 
appear due to the absence of legal accounting standards. According to this report six main 
approaches were identified in relation to the EU ETS. Only a small minority of respondents 
have continued to apply the withdrawn IFRIC 3 as an accounting policy. The most common 
approach keyed out was to recognize the granted allowances at nil value, with the obligation 
recognized at the carrying value of allowances already granted/purchased, with the balance 
at the prevailing market price. There were however more variation when the classification of 
EU ETS on the balance sheet is considered, with 15 different approaches identified in total. 
The auditors also presented their professional critical view on the accounting approaches 
for the EU ETS based on the responds to the survey. They supplied their outlook with 
practical “worked” examples. Moreover, PwC not only surveyed EU ETS accounting issues 
as was already mentioned, but they also provided representation of the “key accounting 
approaches for ‘self generated’ and purchased CERs” from the business point of view and 
their own sentiments. Even though the Company works in the field of auditing and financial 
advisory, the produced report did not advocate particular approaches and/or their 
appropriateness.  
Finally, the major issues that were raised by the respondents had to do with (a) 
difficulties in comparing business performance, (b) time consumed by generating 
accounting treatment in terms of the scheme, (c) challenges for effective operational and 
investment decision making. (PwC, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Literature review 
 
3.1. Emissions trading schemes 
 
Concerning the context and history of the EU ETS, the EC’s Green Paper (2000) is one 
of the most intelligent discussions of the problems to be confronted in designing a cap-and-
trade system. It first signaled the seriousness with which the possibility of ET was being 
considered in Europe. The EC and its staff have provided a wealth of other material 
concerning the origins of the EU ETS.  
The WB annual review of the carbon market provides a global perspective and was cited 
by a number of respondents: The yearly “State and Trends of the Carbon Market” from the 
WB include for some years now a separate chapter on the EU ETS where the most 
important facts are summarized very briefly and where new developments are discussed. 
From the side of standard setters it is necessary to highlight the work of Starbatty 
(2010), who offers a comparative analysis of the mechanisms and types of emissions trading 
schemes throughout the globe, with practical examples of existing schemes. 
Tietenberg (2006, 2008) describes evolution of the ETSs around the world starting with 
theoretical background (cites Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Dales (1968), Crocker (1966) etc) 
and finishes with current trading solutions. Meanwhile, Skjærseth and Wettestad (2009) put 
together all of the pieces concerning the history of the EU ETS 
At the same time Hepburn and Stern (2008) discuss carbon trading as one of the main 
instruments in climate change advocating that carbon trading has been selected as the 
instrument of choice because of its appealing political characteristics. 
In line with already mentioned papers MacKenzie (2008), Bebbington and Larrinaga-
Gonzalez (2008) as well as Engels (2009) analyze the development of the carbon markets. 
Auditing companies touch upon the issue as a means of introduction more specific 
discussions – PwC (2007), Deloitte (2007, 2010). Deloitte (2010) states that a “cap and 
trade program is created when a government, or other enforcing agency, establishes a cap on 
emissions for a defined set of industries or entities.” Ernst & Young (2010) focuses on the 
need for the US companies to “…consider carbon emissions requirements as part of their 
business and financial management strategies now…” since the US, which is the only non-
ratifier industrialized country in the world, will anyway have some kind of carbon emissions 
scheme at some near point in time. 
 
 
Meanwhile, Parker (2010) reviews the EU ETS and thinks that “this experience may 
provide some insight into cap-and-trade design issues currently being debated in the United 
States.” The author discusses the results of Phase 1 raising a question “…to what degree the 
first phase of the ETS achieved real emissions reductions.” Through the analysis of changes 
done prior to Phase 2 as well as expected prospects of Phase 3 the writer concluded that 
“the EU is re-shaping the ETS to improve its efficiency and eliminate some of the problems 
identified during Phase 1 and 2”. 
Among other issues, Kerr (2008) criticizes existing models to fight global warming from 
the point of view of the USA, while Avi-Yonah et al (2008) defend carbon tax as an 
alternative response to cap and trade. Braun (2009) raised a question of how various experts 
(from consultancies, environmental NGOs and the business sector) influenced the 
development of mentioned cap-and-trade scheme (EU ETS). And Callon (2009) considers 
carbon markets as on-going experiments, all the aspects and components of which are 
tested, reflected on and critically evaluated 
From the implementation side of the ETSs two articles stand out. From international 
perspective Kimura (2006) discusses the opportunities and potential problems for 
connection of EU ETS and Japanese Voluntary ETS. The academic provides a 
comprehensive review of differences and similarities in treating credit units between two 
markets. Meanwhile, Fazekas (2008) assesses how new member states react to EU ETS 
based on the example of Hungary. The results of research showed that being included in the 
scheme had not led to significant emissions abatement in the country.  
 
3.2. Allocation 
 
Almost every paper written about the EU ETS could be included under “allocation.” 
The main issue related to allocation, which commanded our attention, is the fact that 
allocation was, with minor exceptions, free for the first two phases, and this triggered a “free 
allocation” (or grandfathering) versus auctioning literature. The most comprehensive review 
of this issue, but especially the realties and the implications of allocation in the first phase, is 
to be found in Ellerman et al (2007).  
Parker (2010) followed Parry et al (1999), who found that auctions of tradable CO2 
permits promise significantly larger efficiency gains than programs which grandfather 
permits. Parker provides a very accessible discussion of the issues and future prospects of 
 
 
the auctioning seeing this type of allocation as the most economic efficient. The writer 
suggests that “the unwillingness of governments to employ auctions as an allocating 
mechanism revolve around equity considerations, including: (1) inability of some covered 
entities to pass through cost because of regulation or exposure to international competition; 
(2) potential drag on a sector’s economic performance from the up-front cost of auctioned 
allowances; and (3) the potential that government will not recycle revenues to alleviate 
compliance costs, international competitiveness impacts, or other equity concerns, resulting 
in the auction costs being the same as a tax.” Also according to the same paper, the situation 
should start to change during Phase 3 and result in “…no free allocation in 2027”. All this 
analysis is done in order to see US perspectives on the question of future allocations.  
Hepburn and Stern (2008) believe that free allocations based on historical emissions 
have significant drawbacks (four are described). The authors take a side of thee auctioning 
method of allocation and suggest that the change should be in a form of a clear and 
transparent policy.  Meanwhile, Deloitte (2010) does not take sides and points out positive 
sides of both types of allocations as opposed to Hopwood (2009), who describes the real-life 
example of the free distribution of permits in the UK – “the distribution of permits was 
made by the relevant European governments, officially on the basis of past experiences and 
future plans but also, it would appear, on the basis of intense corporate lobbying and 
governmental characterizations of their short-term national interest” and its implications for 
the customers of electricity generators (appearance of so-called windfall profits). 
MacKenzie (2008) in his work also discusses the effect of free allocation on electricity 
prices throughout Europe but with less negative attitude as compared to Hopwood. The 
author states that “if its [generator’s] allowances can command a non-zero price, the price of 
electricity must rise correspondingly”.  
On the other hand, Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008) talk about “Significant 
regulatory risks for different companies … from the possibility that the governments decide 
to auction allowances, to restrict their number or to include new sectors, if and when the 
objective to reduce carbon emission by more than 80% (on a 1990 baseline) is translated 
into policy.” 
Every side of the story of allocations has its positive and negative features. Fazekas 
(2008) found that the choice between free allocation and auctioning has “important 
implications on corporate balance sheets and market behavior”. We believe that it is the 
combination and wise implementation that might bring about more benefits to the economic 
entities and society as a whole.  
 
 
3.3 Accounting 
 
The main topic of this paper is the accounting for emissions allowances and all related 
issues.  
Even though the issue at hand nowadays is one of the most important global problems 
its solutions were being proposed before the actual Kyoto Protocol was started. The US was 
the flagmen to introduce a country-wide legislation concerning the environmental protection 
(Clean Air Act, 1990). This brought about a few academic works on how to treat emissions 
allowances. The most concise review of existing accounting standards and necessary 
treatments were suggested by Ewer et al. (1992). Based on the accounting standards of 
FASB the authors proposed and discussed positive and negative sides of three solutions – 
allowance as an inventory, marketable security or intangible. They also advocated reporting 
allowances at fair value for the needs of internal planning and control, whereas for external 
they believe it is best to implement historical cost valuation. 
Another way of treating these allowances was suggested by Wambsganss and Sanford 
(1996). These authors recommended that pollution allowances be treated like donated 
assets, which are valued at market price when received, with a “corresponding increase in 
contributed capital”. The researchers propose for the book value of the allowances to be 
considered as a part of the cost of production, when they are used to compensate for 
pollution. Such treatment, according to the academics, allows recognition of the allowances, 
which helps in more effective estimation of the cost of pollution on the financial statements. 
In a more recent (after the adoption of Kyoto Protocol) work Schaltegger and Burritt 
(2000) opened a discussion of proposed methods of accounting for emissions allowances 
(chapter 7) with a review of current practices by international standard setters. It should be 
noted that the most popular view, according to the authors, was that such allowances are 
considered intangible assets in terms of the financial statements. 
As we can see that the literature is building up but yet it still cannot be called extensive 
whether one is looking for discussions on the measures taken by the standard setters on this 
matter or the research on the business attempts to conquer the issue. 
Starbatty (2010), being a representative of the IASB, provides a brief description of the 
joint project on ETS (between IASB and FASB) as well as discusses the scope of the current 
IASB’s Emissions Trading Schemes project. According to the official web-site of IASB, 
staff plans to present a comprehensive package of the main accounting issues on the project 
 
 
to the boards close to the end of 2010. The exposure draft as a basis for future regulation is 
supposed to be issued by second half of 2011. 
Academics also have more focus on the problems associated with IFRIC3. For example 
Cook (2009) outlines the discussions and debates about accounting for emissions 
allowances that take place among the IASB. Those discussions are still ongoing, pointing to 
both the politics and lobbying that surround the issue as well as the conceptual and technical 
issues involved. At the same time MacKenzie (2009) also concentrates on the official 
recommendation and its failure. He attributes the opposition of businesses to the fact that 
“Corporations generally fear earnings volatility: there is a widespread conviction that 
investors prefer earnings that rise smoothly to those that fluctuate, even around the same 
underlying trend. IFRIC 3 threatened to produce volatility that, in its critics’ eyes, would be 
artificial.” Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008) consider the view of the standard 
setters on “the valuation of granted allowances” and further decline of the interpretation.  
Meanwhile, several of the academics worked on the practical aspects of accounting in 
terms of carbon markets. Engels (2009) surveyed a number of companies across Europe on 
the question of how and if they account for participation in carbon markets. The results of 
the survey showed that even though a relatively high number of surveyed businesses have 
employed different approaches to set question, there is “…a level of ignorance among some 
of the companies showing that they have not used Phase 1 to develop a perspective”. 
Johnston et al. (2008) found that the market assigns a positive value to emission 
allowances that a corporation banks. By this information the authors suggest that allowances 
are viewed as assets by investors. In addition, they also found that the market “reacts when a 
firm buys emission rights.” The writers suggested that this may be the case since the buying 
of emission rights provides investors with some information on the way firm manages the 
risks associated with emissions. 
To finalize the discussion, Zhang-Debreceny et al (2009) argue that problems that arise 
with the IASB have to do with emission rights’ nature – it is unprecedented issue for the 
accountants. The traditional accounting, according to the authors, of assigning asset/liability 
status can only worsen the situation with greenhouse gas abatement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Research Methodology and Findings 
 
a) Methodology 
 
For the practical value of our thesis we decided to survey the disclosure of companies, 
involved in the EU ETS to provide us with empirical data on how companies approach the 
question of accounting treatment of the emissions allowances. For this purpose we used 
several databases that have information on installations, which participate in the EU ETS.  
For the population sample we used countries from EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We chose only 15 countries due to the fact that 
they have to comply not only with EU ETS requirements for the decrease of their emissions 
but also with Kyoto protocol’s requirements. 
Our research consisted of several steps: 
a) Identification of installations that participate in the EU ETS in chosen countries 
b) Connection identified installations with companies that they belong to 
c) Classification of companies according to sector of operations 
d) Data gathering 
e) Qualitative analysis of the existing data, which was divided into answering the 
following questions:  
1) Does the company disclose information about accounting treatment of emissions 
allowances? 
2) If it does, what is the accounting policy? 
f) Analysis of the expectations that a number of financial ratios can influence the 
decision to disclose accounting information on the question 
 
First of all we looked through accounts from Community Independent Transaction Log 
(CITL),25 that are opened, which means that the installations are participating in the EU 
ETS at the moment of research.26
                                                            
25 
 We chose companies on the basis of existing open 
installation in a specific country, which had surplus/shortage of emissions allowances as 
compared to the actual emissions. This criterion was chosen based on the understanding that 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/ 
26 Data gathered on 4th of September 2010. 
 
 
if such surplus/shortage exists then the installation and its parent company have to be 
involved in the trading. 
We also used CITL Carbon Market Data27
After establishing a sample for the analysis we obtained all the opened sources of 
information – annual reports, corporate responsibility reports etc. We took the data starting 
from 2005 and until the most current publications. The year 2005 was chosen as the 
beginning of the EU ETS.  
 database. With the help of this database we 
sorted companies based on sector of operations, organizational form of the company, which 
owns the installation, and existence of the information for analysis. We estimate that the 
current amount of Companies that are active on the EU ETS market is approximately 500 
(for EU-15 countries) based on Carbon Market Data. As a result we found 80 companies or 
groups of companies that trade on the EU ETS market and have published financial 
information in English. 
Moreover, in an attempt to increase the sample by including the data of companies that 
do not have published reports due to organizational structure, we contacted a number of 
companies (approximately 10) to obtain their insight on the questions of accounting for 
emissions allowances. Unfortunately none of the companies replied to our query. 
For our research we analyzed specific sectors that are heavily involved in both emitting 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and as a result in trading emissions allowances on the 
organized market of EU ETS. We included energy, metals, cement, glass and pulp and paper 
producers. These sectors, which are described below, are the basis of the EU ETS. In order 
to expand our sample we also had a number of companies that were representatives from 
various other sectors but had been active on the EU ETS and had open sources of 
information for our analysis. 
Energy activities 
Combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW (excepting 
hazardous or municipal waste installations). 
Ferrous metals production 
Installations for the production of pig iron or steel (primary or secondary fusion) 
including continuous casting, with a capacity exceeding 2.5 tonnes per hour. 
 
 
                                                            
27 http://www.carbonmarketdata.com/en/products/eu-ets-companies-database/key-features 
 
 
Cement 
Installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns with a production 
capacity exceeding 500 tonnes per day or lime in rotary kilns with a production capacity 
exceeding 50 tonnes per day or in other furnaces with a production capacity exceeding 50 
tonnes per day. 
Glass 
Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fibre with a melting capacity 
exceeding 20 tonnes per day. 
Pulp and paper 
Industrial plants for the production of (a) pulp from timber or other fibrous materials (b) 
paper and board with a production capacity exceeding 20 tonnes per day. 
 
During the data gathering stage we found out that companies with a certain level of 
output (in terms of specific installations) are allowed to participate in the EU ETS. However 
as can be seen from the following research findings not all companies decide to disclose 
information about their participation and how they account for it.  
For the purpose of research we implied that the main indicators of financial situation 
(profitability and financial leverage) can be significant in the company’s choice of whether 
or not to disclose. Such implication was based on the belief that companies, that are open to 
the public, would like to maintain good relations with their shareholders. Such relationship 
can be strengthened with appropriate disclosure of new responsibilities (i.e. participation in 
the EU ETS). 
Based on the gathered company data we calculated several financial ratios that 
represented the profitability (profit margin, ROA, ROE) and leverage ratios (Debt-to-Equity 
and equity ratio) of each item in the sample. We computed above-mentioned ratios for five 
consecutive reporting years (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009) on the basis of total assets, 
total debt, total equity, sales and net income figures. This set of data was used to analyze 
whether there is a connection between one or more variables and the company’s decision to 
disclose information about accounting treatment of emissions allowances.  
In order to analyze possible connection we used statistical tool SPSS. With the help of 
this program we ran a logistic regression28
                                                            
28 “Logistic regression is useful for situations in which you want to be able to predict the 
presence or absence of a characteristic or outcome based on values of a set of predictor 
variables” – SPSS User Manual 
. Before hand we checked if there is correlation 
 
 
among included variables (see Table A4 in the Appendices). As a result we found out that 
Profit Margin is highly correlated with ROE, while ROA is equally highly correlated with 
Equity Ratio. Among the financial data used for the computation the correlation is as 
follows: Total Assets, Total Debt, Total Equity and Sales are highly correlated with each 
other. The analysis of correlations led us to decrease the number of variables included in the 
regression, since some of them are interchangeable. Finally in our regression we included 
Profit Margin, ROA, Debt-to-Equity, Total Assets and Net Income as variables. We 
assigned “1” (one) to companies that had any kind of disclosure on the matters of 
accounting for emissions allowances and “0” (zero) to those that had zero disclosure.  
Since we had some interchangeable variables we ran several regressions in order to see 
if the inclusion/exclusion of one or another variable will bring significantly different results. 
 
b) Findings 
 
Our sample of analyzed data comprised 80 companies (the list can be found in Appendix 
5 – Tables A.5.1-A.5.6) that actively participate in the EU ETS and have opened financial 
and managerial corporate information to the public in forms of various reports (annual, 
corporate social responsibility etc). Every company reported trading activity in terms of EU 
ETS. However thirty two analyzed companies had zero information as to the ways of 
accounting for emissions allowances. As a result we achieved information on the accounting 
treatments of 48 companies or groups of companies in a number of sectors (energy 
generators, metal producers, cement sector, pulp and paper manufacturers, glass producers 
and other sectors) 
According to our findings the majority of the companies (45%) consider emissions 
allowances to be intangible assets, while another 38% of the companies did not specify their 
view on the nature of the allowances. Moreover, only 9% of the sample sees mentioned 
allowances as inventory. And finally, 4% consider them assets without specifics and the last 
4% state that they do not recognize the allowances since there is no guidance from the 
standard setters.  
What is more, our statistical analysis allowed us to see that the profitability of the 
company among other performance indicators is the only significant variable, which 
influences the decision to disclose information in question. According to our findings only 
Net Income and Profit Margin had significant values in the regressions. This result 
 
 
confirmed our expectations that companies are more willing to disclose information if they 
are financially sound. 
 
As to the sector disclosure, we found out that: 
• Energy generators (21) 
Out of 21 generators 12 consider emission allowances to be intangible assts. It has to be 
mentioned that in the course of development of the scheme two of these actors (Vattenfall 
and E.ON) changed their preference from inventory to intangible. However no explanation 
of such change was given. Meanwhile, Motor Oil Hellas mentions that allowances have to 
be depreciated over the period of entitlement.  
The rest companies are dispersed as follows: two companies (Suez and Dalkia) started 
accounting for allowances as intangibles and later on moved on to inventories, while seven 
do not present their views on the nature of the emission allowances in the financial 
statements. 
Out of all companies five divide their allowances (a) for settlement of obligation to the 
government and (b) held for trading. Among these generators, three consider allowances 
held for trading to be inventories, while other two account for them as either intangible or 
other assets. 
52% of the companies account allocations received free of charge at nominal value (i.e. 
nil), and one (Vattenfall) of the mentioned generators changed its view from accounting at 
fair value to nominal. Meanwhile only Repsol accounts for the granted allowances at market 
price with respective realisation of the grant in the deferred income. The others do not 
specify their attitude towards the question. 
According to the analyzed data we found that 52% of the energy sample makes a 
provision based on the difference between allocated free of charge allowances and actual 
emissions at fair value at the date of the balance sheet. On the other hand 48% account for 
the difference as a liability with effects in operating expenses.  
All of the generators recognize the acquisition of additional allowances at market price 
and make a note that impairment is attributed to income statement. Some even specify that it 
goes directly to the cost of sales. Also it should be noted whilst the majority of energy 
generators recognizes the results of sales of excess allowances in other income, one (Dalkia) 
of the generators assigns these results to the reduction of cost of sales. 
 
 
 
 
• Metal producers (7) 
While only two (ThyssenKrupp and Outukumpu) metal producers account for the 
allowances as intangible assets, the majority does not specify the nature of the emission 
allowances in accounting policies. 
All of the analyzed producers account for granted (allocated free of charge) allowances 
at cost (nil value) on the balance sheet. If there is a difference between allocated free of 
charge allowances and actual emissions, they make a provision. Six out of seven companies 
record at cost the purchase of additional necessary allowances as well as contribute the 
revenue from the sale of excess to the income statement, while Evonik chooses lower of cost 
or net realizable value. 
 
• Cement (6) 
Cement industry is filled with groups that operate all over Europe. Seven of the 
companies that are trading in the emissions market and have adequate financial information 
opened were analyzed for the purpose of this study. One of them (Cementir) gave no 
disclosure as to the accounting treatment in question.  
Half of the sample treats allocated allowances free of charge at cost, which is nil. Two of 
them make provisions for a possible shortage of allowances at book value. However at the 
question of the nature of the allowances the views separated. One company (Dyckendorff) 
assumes allowances are inventories, another account for them as intangibles 
(Heidelbergcement). The third one (Lafarge) had a different approach – if the allowances 
cover actual emissions (higher than covered by the grant), they are attributed to the cost of 
sales, whereas in the instance allowances are planned for future emission coverage or for 
sale they are treated as intangibles. 
Two more companies (Titan and Notdkalk) prefer to net the liability and report the 
shortage at cost, while the last producer (Valderrivas) categorized allowances as non-
amortizable intangible assets and according to its policy accounts for allocated allowances 
(granted) at market value with respective movement in the deferred income line. 
The views of the cement producers also diverged on the question of how to treat results 
from the sale of excess allowances. One of them has a traditional approach of attributing 
them to operating income, while another company writes them down to the reduction of cost 
of sales. 
 
 
 
• Pulp and Paper (6) 
In the pulp and paper industry there are a lot of companies, however only six of them are 
open to the contact in terms of financial information.  
67% of the sample considers allowances to be intangible assets. Three companies (SCA, 
ENCE and Sequana) account for allocated allowances at market value, make respective 
contribution to deferred income as well as provisions for the possible difference of 
allowances and actual emissions.  
Meanwhile, two companies (SKG and MM) account for the granted allowances at 
nominal value (nil), however while one make a provision the other sees the rise in the 
liability, when there is a difference. The last paper producer (Ahlstrom) nets the grant with 
the liability and makes provisions.  
Finally, all of the paper manufacturers attribute to the income the results of sales of 
excess allowances. 
 
• Glass (3) 
In our sample of glass manufacturers we had only four companies, one (AGC) of them 
did not have any information as to the accounting treatments of emission allowances even 
though it actively trades on the EU ETS market. 
The disclosure of other three companies is to our opinion poor. None of them specifies 
the nature of the allowances and any additional treatment other than they net the granted 
allowances with their emissions and one (Saint-Gobein) of them makes a provision 
(according to the chosen policy). However, to this moment (based on the results of 2009) 
the amount of allowances mostly equals to the level of emissions, which does not provide a 
necessity for accounting. 
 
• Other (5) 
The starting list of companies that were combined to this group consisted of 18 
representatives. During the analysis we found out that even though these companies actively 
involved in the emissions trading, the majority does not see fit to disclose information on 
how it affects their financial situation. The rest of the sample provides limited information 
on the question. 
Only two (Agrana and Michelin) out of five companies account for emissions 
allowances as intangible assets, while the rest either does not recognize the allowances 
 
 
(Bonduelle) due to lack of official guidance or does not specify personal views (Carlsberg 
and Nordic Sugar).  
As to the free allocation, Carlsberg and Agrana account at nominal cost (nil), while 
Michelin works with fair values and deferred income. Three companies (Nordic Sugar, 
Carlsberg and Agrana) disclosed how they deal with difference that might arise between 
granted allowances and actual emissions for the period. The first two companies account for 
liability, while the last one makes a provision at fair value on the date of the report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Concerns over global warming have led to proposals for the establishment of market for 
greenhouse gas emission reductions. The major impact was the establishment of Kyoto 
Protocol in the mid-1990s. According to the Protocol most developed countries agreed to 
legally binding targets that will reduce emissions of the six main greenhouse gases by at 
least 5% below 1990 levels over the period 2008-2012. Since then the question of emissions 
trading became one of the most important agendas not only on political level but also on the 
corporate.  
One of the challenges that our world is facing today is how to account for these 
emissions. The International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee issued IFRIC 3, 
Emission Rights. However, significant pressure from various parties, who objected the 
financial consequences of applying that interpretation, led to the cancellation of mentioned 
document. 
At the moment there exists no uniform guidance on the question of how to treat 
emissions rights, but the IFRS developers have produced several approaches to account for 
the effects of emissions trading schemes. The existence of a number of approaches brings 
about complications for the users of financial information, since the statements become 
incomparable. And the more problems come up if the company is participating in the 
emissions abatement scheme but does not reveal its accounting policies. 
 
For the purposes of this research we posed questions concerning how businesses account 
for emissions allowances operating under EU ETS. Literature review suggested that the 
views of various companies split across the whole territory of the EU. To provide this paper 
with current data we conducted empirical study. It was concerned with the overall disclosure 
on the question and more specific items like the nature of emissions allowances according to 
companies’ accounting policies etc. Moreover, we tested the expectation that company’s 
financial situation can influence its decision to disclose information on accounting treatment 
of emissions allowances. 
Our findings showed that even though companies from various sectors are involved in 
the EU ETS, part of them does not feel the necessity to disclose information on the actual 
accounting practices. Our sample consisted of 80 companies from 6 sectors. Only 48 of 
them had opened up information for the public about their treatments of emissions rights.  
 
 
In a more specific analysis we had the following results: the majority of the companies 
(45%) consider emissions allowances to be intangible assets, while another 38% of the 
companies did not specify their view on the nature of the allowances. Moreover, only 9% of 
the sample sees mentioned allowances as inventory. Finally, 4% consider them assets 
without specifics and the last 4% state that they do not recognize the allowances since there 
is no guidance from the standard setters.  
The sector analysis brought us to conclusion that energy producers give preference to 
treating allowances as intangibles. The same can be said about pulp and paper sector. 
Meanwhile metal producers (the second carbon-intensive industry) prefer not to specify the 
nature of the rights. Moreover, cement manufacturers diverged in their practices so there is 
no general pattern. Finally glass producers as well as companies from other various sectors 
had very poor disclosure on the raised question. We can attribute such level of the glass 
manufacturers to the lack of necessity for accounting since emissions do not surpass the 
allocated allowances (as of end of 2009 financial year). 
Our last stage of analysis was testing if chosen financial ratios and company data is 
significant for company’s decision to disclose accounting information. As a result we found 
out that financial stability in terms of profitability is the only financial influence on the 
company’s choice. 
 
Finally, we would like to clarify that the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol began 
not so long ago. We believe that the majority of the problems can only be resolved with the 
passage of time and future research. In the meantime, in our view, businesses should come 
together with the standard setters and have more influence and participation in the questions 
of defining accounting for emissions rights. This has to be done mainly because companies 
are the ones that need to disclose such information and make their shareholders happy. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1. Relative contributions of gases to global warming29
Gas 
 
Lifetime Global warming potential 
(100-year horizon) 
Relative contribution 
over 100 years (%) 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 50–200 years 1 61 
Methane (CH4) 10 years 21 15 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 150 years 290 4 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 100 years various 11 
HCFC-22 13 years 1,500 0.5 
Others various various 8.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
29 These gases are also those that are subject to regulation via the Kyoto protocol. There are other gases (such 
as water vapour) that create radiative forcing but their overall effect is minor compared to this basket of gases 
and the concentrations. 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Table A2. Selected GCC impacts30
 
 
a)  Seasons have been changing with spring arriving earlier. This has some positive 
impacts (for example, lengthening growing seasons) but also raises some problems 
for ecological integrity. For example, plants, insect and birdlife synchronicity (for 
example the link between caterpillars being hatched at the time when there is 
plentiful food for hem which in turn is synchronised with bird hatching) may be 
disrupted. Seasonal changes, therefore, may disrupt ecosystem functioning and 
individual species may suffer. These sorts of changes may also have an impact on 
the prevalence and impact of pest species on food production. 
b) Given there is more energy in the atmosphere the frequency and intensity of adverse 
weather events (for example, storms, storm surges, hurricanes, typhoons and 
tornados) may increase. This may cause loss of life, either directly (during the storm) 
or indirectly (following the weather event due to disruption of food production 
and/or disease following loss of functioning sanitation systems). Economic losses 
from disruption of activities (such as offshore oil and gas production) may also 
follow from such events. The incidence of heat waves may also have similar 
impacts, leading to deaths that would not have otherwise occurred. 
c) Changing precipitation levels will likely arise from the distribution of warming 
effects. Areas at the equator are expected to be drier (leading to more drought, crop 
failure and potentially more starvation) with those nearer the poles being wetter 
(leading possibly to crop failures and associated disruption such as flooding and 
landslides). Water shortages in drier zones may also lead to more conflict triggered 
by access to resources with associated displacement of civilian populations. Patterns 
of human habitation will also change as a result and large scale migration of 
environmental refugees may occur. Drought stress is likely to be experienced most 
severely in areas that are already under  
 
 
                                                            
30 These examples are drawn from Stern (2006). They also demonstrate the systemic effect of changes to the 
climate system. That is, for any impact there are many potential environmental, social and economic 
ramifications. 
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multiple environmental, social and economic pressures. Desertification and soil 
erosion may arise in these circumstances as well. 
d) Warming may impact on the size of glaciers and other ice cover with multiple 
effects. Where glaciers provide water resources to human populations (such as those 
in the Himalayas), then drinking water shortages may arise as will irrigation water 
shortages (with knock-on effects for food production and hunger). A sea level rise 
will also occur if there is a substantial melting of polar ice. While this has obvious 
impacts for human habitation around river deltas and coastlines, life in the sea will 
also be affected by changing salinity that may arise with large scale melting. Given 
the developing world depends heavily on fish for protein this will have further 
knock-on impacts on human populations. Warming at the poles also affects land that 
was previously permafrost. This has knock-on effects on forestry, transportation 
routes and housing (and other infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines) in these 
parts of the world. In addition, methane that is currently frozen in the permafrost 
may be released (as carbon in other soils could do so as well) which would 
accelerate GHG concentrations and may create what is termed a ‘runaway effect’. 
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Table A3 Approaches applied in practice to account for cap-and-trade schemes 
 Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 
Initial recognition – 
Allocated Allowances 
Recognize and measure at market value at date of 
issue; 
corresponding entry to government grant. 
Recognize and measure at cost, 
which for granted offsets is nil. 
Initial recognition – 
Purchased 
Allowances 
Recognize and measure at cost. 
Subsequent treatment 
of allowances 
Allowances are subsequently measured at cost or 
market value, subject to review for impairment. 
Allowances are subsequently 
measured at cost, subject to review 
for impairment. 
Subsequent treatment 
of government grant 
Government grant amortized on a systematic and 
rational basis over compliance period. 
Not applicable 
Recognition of 
Liability 
Recognize liability when incurred (i.e. as emissions 
are produced). 
Recognize liability when incurred 
(i.e. as emissions are produced). 
However, the way in which the 
liability is measured (see below) 
means that often no liability is 
shown in the statement of financial 
position until emissions produced 
exceed the offsets allocated to the 
participant. 
Measurement 
of liability 
Liability is 
measured based 
on the market 
value of allowances 
at each period end 
that would be 
required to cover 
actual emissions, 
regardless of 
whether the 
offsets are on hand 
or would be 
purchased from the 
market. 
Liability is measured based 
on: 
the carrying amount of 
offsets on hand at each 
period end to be used to 
cover actual emissions (ie 
market value at date of 
recognition if cost model is 
used; market value at date 
of revaluation if  evaluation 
model is used) on either a 
FIFO or weighted average 
basis; plus the market 
value of offsets at each 
period end that would be 
required to cover any excess 
emissions (ie actual 
emissions in excess of 
offsets on hand). 
Liability is measured based on: 
the carrying amount of offsets  on 
hand at each period end to be used 
to cover actual emissions (nil or 
cost) on a FIFO or weighted 
average basis; plus 
the market value of offsets at each 
period end that  would be required 
to cover any excess emissions (ie 
actual emissions in excess of 
offsets on hand). 
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Table A4 Correlations 
 ProfitMargin ROA ROE DebtToEquity EquityRatio TotalAssets TotalDebt TotalEquity Sales NetIncome 
ProfitMargin Pearson 
Correlation 
1 ,002 ,987** -,035 -,005 ,223** -,020 -,023 -,026 ,344** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,977 ,000 ,517 ,929 ,000 ,707 ,675 ,636 ,000 
N 345 345 345 345 345 345 344 345 345 345 
ROA Pearson 
Correlation 
,002 1 -,002 -,019 ,999** -,021 ,006 ,008 ,002 ,013 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,977  ,972 ,719 ,000 ,694 ,916 ,888 ,975 ,803 
N 345 345 345 345 345 345 344 345 345 345 
ROE Pearson 
Correlation 
,987** -,002 1 -,032 -,005 ,231** -,017 -,019 -,020 ,350** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,972  ,554 ,933 ,000 ,749 ,726 ,716 ,000 
N 345 345 345 345 345 345 344 345 345 345 
DebtToEquity Pearson 
Correlation 
-,035 -,019 -,032 1 -,014 -,062 -,013 -,071 -,078 -,104 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,517 ,719 ,554  ,797 ,250 ,806 ,190 ,150 ,054 
N 345 345 345 345 345 345 344 345 345 345 
EquityRatio Pearson 
Correlation 
-,005 ,999** -,005 -,014 1 -,018 ,011 ,011 ,003 ,004 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,929 ,000 ,933 ,797  ,741 ,843 ,833 ,958 ,948 
N 345 345 345 345 345 345 344 345 345 345 
TotalAssets Pearson 
Correlation 
,223** -,021 ,231** -,062 -,018 1 ,927** ,946** ,928** ,474** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,694 ,000 ,250 ,741  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 345 345 345 345 345 345 344 345 345 345 
TotalDebt Pearson 
Correlation 
-,020 ,006 -,017 -,013 ,011 ,927** 1 ,907** ,914** ,306** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,707 ,916 ,749 ,806 ,843 ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 
TotalEquity Pearson 
Correlation 
-,023 ,008 -,019 -,071 ,011 ,946** ,907** 1 ,921** ,407** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,675 ,888 ,726 ,190 ,833 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 
N 345 345 345 345 345 345 344 345 345 345 
Sales Pearson 
Correlation 
-,026 ,002 -,020 -,078 ,003 ,928** ,914** ,921** 1 ,511** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,636 ,975 ,716 ,150 ,958 ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 
N 345 345 345 345 345 345 344 345 345 345 
 
 
NetIncome Pearson 
Correlation 
,344** ,013 ,350** -,104 ,004 ,474** ,306** ,407** ,511** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,803 ,000 ,054 ,948 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000  
N 345 345 345 345 345 345 344 345 345 345 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A5.1. Energy 
producers 
Energy 
Company Disclosure 
BP No 
Centrica Yes 
Chevron No 
Dalkia Yes 
DEH Yes 
E.ON Yes 
Edison Yes 
Endesa Yes 
Enel Yes 
Eni It Yes 
Essent Yes 
Evonik Yes 
Exxon Mobil No 
Fenosa Yes 
Fortum Yes 
Hellenic Petroleum Yes 
Helsingin Energia Yes 
Hera Group No 
Hess Corp No 
Maersk Oil No 
Marathon Oil No 
Motor Oil Hellas Yes 
Petroplus Holding Yes 
Premier Oil No 
Repsol Yes 
RWE Yes 
Safran No 
Shell No 
Suez Yes 
Talisman Ent No 
Terna No 
Total Yes 
Vattenfall Yes 
 
 
Table A5.2. Metals 
producers 
Metals 
Company Disclosure 
Akzo Nobel Yes 
ArcelorMittal Yes 
BHP Billiton No 
Corus Yes 
Evonik Yes 
Freeport-
McMorgan No 
Outukumpu Yes 
Riva Group No 
Tata Steel No 
ThyssenKrupp Yes 
Voestalpine Yes 
 
Table A5.3. Cement 
producers 
Cement 
Company Disclosure 
Cementir No 
Dyckendorff Yes 
Lafarge Group Yes 
Heidelberg Cement Yes 
Valderrivas Yes 
Nordkalk Yes 
Titan Yes 
 
Table A5.4. Paper 
producers 
Paper 
Company Disclosure 
Ahlstrom yes 
Burgo no 
ENCE yes 
Mayr-Melnhof Group yes 
SCA yes 
Sequana yes 
Smurfit Kappa Group yes 
Table A5.5. Glass 
producers 
Glass 
Company Disclosure 
Ahlstrom yes 
Asahi Glass Company (AGC) no 
Saint-Gobein yes 
Yioula yes 
 
Table A5.6. Others 
Others 
Company Disclosure 
Agrana yes 
Alstom no 
Bonduelle yes 
Bunge no 
Carlsberg yes 
Caterpillar no 
Colgate no 
Daimler no 
Danone no 
Group Bel no 
Michelin yes 
NCC no 
Nestle no 
Nordic Sugar yes 
Premier 
Foods no 
Siemens no 
Skanska no 
Unilever no 
 
 
